This is the accepted version of the paper.
In this paper, I analyze the provision of tune-ins (preview advertisements for broadcasters' upcoming programs) in an oligopolistic television (TV) market. Tune-ins constitute an important component of TV advertising. Anand and Shachar [1998] This implies quite a large opportunity cost for CBS given that the average price for a 30-second commercial was approximately $4 million. Table 1 Why would TV stations pass up the opportunity of earning several millions of dollars from sponsor advertisements (henceforth, ads) and instead choose to promote their own programs? Generally speaking, tune-ins are informative ads that help viewers better evaluate the expected utility of watching the promoted program. 1 Upon seeing a tune-in, some viewers will realize a high match and watch the promoted program rather than switch to another station. Similarly, some will realize a bad match and switch away.
Holding constant the aggregate audience size, I refer to the net increase in a station's audience share as a result of this two-way ‡ow as the "business-stealing" role of tuneins. A tune-in may also persuade some viewers to stay tuned rather than switch o¤ completely. In this case, the tune-in has a "demand creation" role. Overall, these two factors determine the e¤ectiveness of a tune-in and whether the increase it creates in total viewership is enough to o¤set the opportunity cost it involves. In fact, a week after the 2013 Super Bowl, Nielsen announced that CBS took 8 of the 10 top spots in ratings, thus justifying to some extent CBS's strategy of airing a high number of tune-ins.
The TV industry has some distinctive features. First, existence of TV programs is a priori known to everyone. Therefore, a TV station's decision to air or not to air a tune-in must account for the possible inferences its viewers will draw in the absence of a tune- help viewers make better-informed decisions and lower their sampling costs.
The main …ndings can be summarized as follows. First, provided that the opportunity cost of airing a tune-in is not too high, the business-stealing motive alone is generally su¢ cient to ensure that TV stations air tune-ins in equilibrium. Second, even if TV stations are fully informed about their rival's upcoming program, their tune-in decisions do not necessarily depend on this information. When they do depend, however, TV stations air fewer tune-ins on average and viewers make interim-stage inferences not only for the upcoming program of the station they watch but also for that of the other station.
As a result, the resulting aggregate welfare is generally higher compared to when tunein decisions are made independently. Third, when tune-in decisions do not depend on the knowledge of the rival's program, the opportunity costs TV stations incur by airing tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins may be socially better. In other words, it may be welfare-improving if the two stations shared a common ownership or if they coordinated on airing no tune-ins. However, when tune-ins depend on both upcoming programs, they may enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of the ine¢ cient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any tune-ins.
The sampling process I adopt plays an important role in the analysis. Broadly speaking, it is a dynamic learning process in which a decision-maker chooses among one certain (the outside option) and two uncertain (the second-period TV programs) alternatives until she …nds the optimal time to stop. This approach is closely related to multi-armed bandit problems in which a single decision-maker sequentially experiments among a …xed set of alternatives (see, among others, Rothschild [1974] and Bergemann and Valimaki [1996] ). In my model, each uncertain alternative (i.e., each TV program) fully unfolds as the decision-maker (i.e., the viewer) experiments it for a …xed amount of time, there are increasing returns to engaging in an alternative (viewers do not derive any utility from watching only a portion of a TV program) and time is …nite. Many real-life decision problems resemble this framework. Examples include a student choosing from a set of elective courses at the beginning of a semester, a group of tourists bar-hopping to …nd the most enjoyable pub, or a gambler trying to …nd the "best"slot machine in a casino.
In all of these cases, the alternatives are mutually exclusive within a given period, so experimentation involves a positive opportunity cost. Moreover, as the time is …nite, experimentation will potentially alter the relative utility of the current choice versus the other alternatives -an important feature of the sampling process I adopt.
Despite the peculiar features of the TV market, the main elements of the analysis can be extended to other markets, especially to those that are segmented with respect to consumer preferences. For instance, one may look at other media markets that share similar features with the TV market (e.g., radio market, market for movies, internet news portals [2011] focus on the disclosure of horizontal attributes in a Hotelling framework. In contrast to the celebrated "information unraveling"result of the quality disclosure literature, these papers show that equilibria typically involve partial information revelation when 2 The current analysis may also be helpful in studying a model of electoral competition whereby political candidates advertise through media (which can be quite segmented in terms of the political attitudes of its audience) before the electoral voting takes place. Janssen and Teteryatnikova [2015] approach this problem in a two-candidate setup. In their analysis, there is no media and disclosure reaches everyone. In this sense, my approach is complementary to theirs.
products have horizontal attributes. 3 properties in a Hotelling setting with no intrinsic quality di¤erences. They …nd that full information disclosure is the unique outcome only if pricing and disclosure decisions are made simultaneously, and comparative advertising is allowed. Otherwise, a large set of non-disclosure equilibria exist. Meurer and Stahl [1994] analyze the welfare properties of informative advertising in a duopoly model à la Grossman and Shapiro [1984] , where a fraction of buyers are uninformed about the product characteristics. Anand and Shachar
[2009] consider a similar setup in which a …rm can advertise only through one or both of two available media channels and consumer preferences over product attributes are perfectly correlated with their choice of media channel. However, ads are noisy in their analysis, meaning that consumers may get the wrong idea from an ad. 4 To the best of my knowledge, there are no previous theoretical studies of tune-ins.
There are, however, empirical studies that analyze the e¤ects of tune-ins on viewers' 3 The pioneering works on veri…able quality disclosure are Grossman [1981] , Grossman and Hart [1980] and Milgrom [1981] . They all reach the 'information unraveling'result in a monopolistic setting: quality is fully revealed in all perfect Bayesian equilibria as long as there is a credible and costless way of communicating it. There is a large literature that o¤ers various extensions to this framework. See Dranova and Jin [2010] for a recent survey on the subject. 4 See Renault [2015] for an overview of the recent literature on advertising and veri…able disclosure. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce the main model and characterize the equilibria. Section 3 argues when it may be welfare improving to ban tune-ins. Section 4 discusses the …ndings and concludes.
The Model
There cannot lie in a tune-in (i.e., each station is legally bound to advertise a preview of the actual program) and that the tune-in is fully informative. The objective of each TV station is to maximize its total advertising revenue, which equals the size of its audience in each period times the per-viewer revenue it earns. Per-viewer revenue is (A 1)p if a station airs a tune-in, and Ap if it does not.
On the other side of the market, there is a continuum of a unit mass of potential viewers. They are uniformly distributed along the unit interval with respect to their ideal programs. A viewer who is located at 2 [0; 1] obtains a net utility u t ( ; x) = v t j xj in period t = 1; 2 from watching a program located at x. 6 Viewers'ideal programs stay the same over the periods. Not watching TV yields zero bene…ts. 7 Since the main focus of this paper is on the optimal tune-in behavior of TV stations and how this depends on their knowledge of the rival's upcoming program, I assume that viewers have complete information about the …rst programs, and for simplicity that viewers with 2 [0; 1 2 ] watch Y and viewers with 2 ( A viewer makes a decision at each instance that maximizes her total utility. I allow viewers to switch between stations or switch o¤ completely whenever they wish so.
However, this comes at a cost. To model this costly switching process, I assume that the amount of time required to learn the true location of a program is constant and the same for all programs and all viewers. Let k denote this amount of time. If a viewer samples a program for k minutes and then decides to watch it until the end with no further sampling, then she is able to enjoy the program fully. If, on the other hand, she switches away (to the other station or switch o¤ completely) after k minutes, then she will have missed the …rst k minutes of her …nal choice, and therefore will not receive the full bene…t of doing it. In other words, sampling a program entails a positive opportunity cost. For simplicity, I assume that each missed k minutes of a viewer's …nal choice lowers the net utility of that choice by c > 0, and this is same for all options. I will henceforth refer to it as the "sampling cost." I assume that k is relatively short, and as such, c is relatively small compared to v (to be more speci…c, I assume v > 2c).
The particular way I model program sampling o¤ers tractability for an otherwise complicated process, and plays an important role in the analysis. Most importantly, the opportunity cost of sampling is irreversible once a viewer chooses to engage in sampling, and this alters the relative utility of the current choice versus the other options. This means that some viewers may end up watching a program, which they would not choose to watch under perfect information. As a result, when v is at an intermediate value such that all viewers engage in sampling but not all watch TV at the end, the aggregate audience size will be higher the more uncertainty viewers have about program attributes.
Similarly, for the same range of v, aggregate audience size will be increasing in c. As described in the Introduction, the particular way I model the sampling process resembles …nite-horizon learning models in many ways. If there are increasing returns to engaging in an activity, similar results would arise in these environments, too.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, Nature selects the values of y and z independently from a discrete uniform density function with support 0; ] watch Y and those with 2 ( 
Benchmark
I start with two benchmark situations: (i) perfect information about program attributes, and (ii) incomplete information with no tune-ins. Although the …rst one is a hypothetical situation, it serves as a useful benchmark to observe the role of incomplete information.
The second one is a relevant situation because it may possibly arise as an equilibrium outcome. Moreover, it will serve as an important benchmark for understanding the optimal sampling behavior of viewers.
(i) Perfect information:
Under perfect information, viewers do not engage in sampling and there is no need for tune-ins. Hence, all we need to determine is which station each viewer watches, and then aggregate the viewership to reach the …nal audience shares. Recall that the utility of watching a program located at x for a viewer at is u ( ; x) = v j xj. If, for instance, y < z and (z y) < 2v, then there will be a unique indi¤erent viewer located at y+z 2
. Viewers with locations maxfy v; 0g < Table 2 . Audience shares of Y and Z under full information.
(ii) Incomplete information with no tune-ins:
This is the most natural benchmark to start with under incomplete information. When tune-ins are not allowed, o¤-equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant, so we just need to focus on viewers'optimal sampling/switching behavior. Without any new information provided, viewers make their second-period sampling/watching decisions based fully on their prior beliefs. Since their priors are symmetric across the two stations, if they decide to engage in sampling, then they will pick randomly (with equal chances) one of the stations. , it is optimal to also sample Z for the viewers with locations ).
This is greater than the utility of switching o¤, c, when
, which is again the same condition. One also has to check if engaging in the …rst sampling is optimal. As before, given that it is optimal when v do not watch TV at all and instead take the outside option from the beginning. This is exactly for the same reasons a viewer does not choose to sample z after observing y = 1 2 or 1.
To summarize, when v < units from the viewer's location, 10 The expected utility of the …rst sampling is then she watches that program without any further sampling. Otherwise, she samples the program at the other station, too (and switch o¤ at the end if she cannot …nd anything she likes). In this case, the tune-in serves the business-stealing motive by deterring viewers from switching to the other station. Table 3 presents the audience shares for v < 1 2 c.
11 Table 3a . Audience shares of Y and Z with no tune-ins when v < Table 3b . Audience shares of Y and Z with no tune-ins when
It is important to highlight that incomplete information lowers the aggregate audience size relative to perfect information when v is relatively small (i.e., when v < c, all viewers sample at least one of the two upcoming programs and some will have a negative ex-post net utility (which can be as low as 2c). Thus, a regime with no tune-in does not only help a TV station save on the opportunity costs tune-ins involve but does it also increase the aggregate audience size, a win-win situation. 12 However, use of tune-ins will typically change this situation since TV stations will compete for viewers to deter them from switching away. 11 When v Table 3b except for (y; z) = (0; 0), (1; 1). 12 Note that ex-ante commitment to a no tune-in policy would be optimal in such a case. c, the audience share of each station in a no tune-in SPBE will be as in Table 3b . Suppose that station Y deviates by airing a tune-in for y = 0 (the analysis is symmetric for y =
Common private information

2
). This is an o¤-equilibrium action, so one needs to specify o¤-equilibrium beliefs. I will here focus on passive o¤-equilibrium beliefs whereby viewers'prior beliefs about the competing program remain unchanged in response to an unanticipated tune-in. 13 Hence, after seeing an unexpected tune-in for y = 0, the …rst-period viewers of Y will continue to believe that z is equally likely to be 0, , as given in Table 3b . Given
, deviation is pro…table in both cases if
where the left-hand side is the expected increase in the second-period total advertising revenue with a tune-in, and the right-hand side is the (opportunity) cost of the tune-in.
After simplifying, this condition reduces to A > . In order to focus more on the informational e¤ects of tune-ins and to minimize the role of exogenous costs in non-disclosure, I will henceforth assume
. This is also in line with the majority of the veri…able quality disclosure literature. With this assumption, the above unilateral deviations are always pro…table and therefore a no tune-in SPBE does not exist.
14 A feature that is common to all SPBE is that q Y (1; z) = 0 for all z, and q Z (y; 0) = 0 for all y; i.e., regardless of the rival's upcoming program, neither station will air a tunein for the program that o¤ers the poorest match for its own …rst-period audience. This is immediate since a TV station could only gain (and not lose) by concealing the least favorable information (see Lemma 1 in the Online Appendix). However, this does not mean that a station's upcoming program is never fully revealed to its own …rst-period 14 The large A assumption would be readily satis…ed if the TV stations had a high number of nonprogram minutes, or if they could use 'crawls,'which are scrolling texts at the bottom of the TV screen. In the latter case, the opportunity cost of a tune-in would be zero, and as such, the large A assumption would be satis…ed for any c > 0.
audience. In fact, there is a fully self-revealing SPBE in which station Y airs a tune-in as long as y 6 = 1 and Z airs a tune-in as long as z 6 = 0. These strategies do not depend on the rival's program, and therefore, viewers' priors for the other station's upcoming program remain unchanged.
To see the working of this SPBE, suppose y = 0 and station Y airs a tune-in. The viewers of Y will continue to think that z is equally likely to be 0,
). Therefore this fully self-revealing SPBE always exists. Table 4 presents the audience shares in this SPBE for Table 4 . Audience shares of Y and Z in the fully self-revealing SPBE when In the cross-signaling SPBE, tune-ins induce di¤erent inferences about the rival station's program than the fully self-revealing SPBE. If, for instance, station Y airs a tune-in for y = 0, its viewers will infer that z equals 0 or , she samples station Z, too. 15 Arguing along similar lines, one can reach the audience shares in Table 4 .
As described in Proposition 1, the cross-signaling SPBE can be sustained only if on-equilibrium audience size is 1 4 as given in Table 5 . Hence, deviation is pro…table if Table 5 . Audience shares of Y and Z in the cross-signaling SPBE when
An important feature of the cross-signaling SPBE is that the aggregate audience share is the same as in a no tune-in regime. In contrast to the fully self-revealing SPBE, now neither station airs a tune-in for a program that is unanimously more superior for its …rst-period viewers than its rival's upcoming program. When, for instance, station Y airs a tune-in for y = 0, it is understood that z is either 0 or c, unlike the other two cases, o¤-equilibrium beliefs make a di¤erence.
In particular, three other SPBE exist under the following non-passive o¤-equilibrium beliefs: if station Y deviates and airs a tune-in, then it must be that z = 0 or ). Importantly, the latter two SPBE are cross-signaling both on and o¤ the equilibrium path. That is, they do reveal information about the competing station's upcoming program. The no tune-in SPBE, on the other hand, is not cross-signaling on the equilibrium path, but is supported by o¤-equilibrium beliefs that are cross-signaling: if, say, station Y deviates by airing a tune-in for y = 0 (or for y = ), then viewers believe that z is either 0 or 
Small v and new demand creation
When v is small, viewers become more hesitant to engage in program sampling. As a result, in the absence of a tune-in, a substantial fraction of viewers switch o¤ right away. This has two important implications. First, tune-ins now increase the audience size mainly by creating new demand (i.e., persuading viewers not to switch o¤). Second, fewer viewers engage in sampling and therefore the hold-up problem is less severe. These two implications together make airing a tune-in more valuable for each TV station.
, the fully self-revealing SPBE is the unique SPBE.
The fully self-revealing SPBE exists for small v for the same reasons as before: if a station fails to air a tune-in, all of its viewers switch o¤ and never come back. Station Y , for instance, generates an audience share of v on the equilibrium path by airing a tune-in for y = 0. If it doesn't air a tune-in, on the other hand, its audience share will be 0.
(which is true given that v > 2c), a deviation is never pro…table (similar
). Table 6 presents the audience shares for this case.
v; v 2v 2c; v y = 1 v 2c; v 2c v 2c; 2v 2c 0; v Table 6 . Audience shares of Y and Z in the fully self-revealing SPBE when v < in the …rst period. Per-viewer revenue in the second period is the average of the audience shares given in Table 3b , multiplied with pA. Given that stations Y and Z are ex-ante identical, the ex-ante expected per-viewer revenue of each station can be expressed as
where the superscript N T stands for 'no tune-in.' In the fully self-revealing SPBE, station Y airs a tune-in in six of the nine (y; z) pairs. Thus, the per-viewer revenue it generates in the …rst period is 6 9 (A 1) + p. Per-viewer revenue in the second period is the average of the audience shares given in Table 4 , multiplied with pA. Hence,
where the superscript SR stands for 'self-revealing,' and j = Y , Z. Similarly, in the cross-signaling SPBE, station Y is expected to air a tune-in in four of the nine possible (y; z) pairs. Given the audience shares in Table 5 , it then follows that
where the superscript CS stands for 'cross-signaling.' Taking di¤erences, we reach
Simple comparison yields that E[
Hence, expected revenues are highest in a regime of no tune-ins and lowest in the fully self-revealing SPBE.
As described earlier, the expected second-period audience size in a regime of no tune-ins is the same as in the cross-signaling SPBE. However, in a regime of no tune-ins, TV stations generate higher revenues in the …rst period. As for the cross-signaling SPBE versus the fully self-revealing SPBE, the former is less costly than the latter because it involves fewer tune-ins. Moreover, the cross-signaling SPBE is associated with a higher expected audience size in the second period since viewers will have less precise information about the upcoming programs in the cross-signaling SPBE and therefore will engage in more program sampling (and given that the cost of sampling becomes sunk once it happens, a higher fraction of those who do sampling will stay tuned).
In the Appendix, I describe how to calculate the ex-ante expected utility of a random viewer in regime i (i = N T , SR, CS), denoted by E[U i ]. As provided at the end of the Appendix, the resulting expected utility di¤erences are given by
Given that 
Even though viewers are unambiguously better o¤ in the fully self-revealing SPBE, the average amount of revenue stations lose could be very high (the second term in the above brackets). This is due not only to the opportunity costs stations incur by airing tune- will imply a large revenue loss in the second period compared to a no tune-in regime.
Therefore, once again, the aggregate welfare under the N T regime will be higher.
The curve indicated by Figure 1 is, for a given v and A, the locus of [
FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
For the cross-signaling SPBE, using expressions (2) and (4), the di¤erence in the expected social welfare between CS and N T regimes can similarly be expressed as
Once again, for the same reasons as above, W CS W N T will tend to be positive as p ! 0, and negative as c ! 0 (recall that c < 1 8 , so 1 3 c > 0). Now, however, it will not depend on how small or large A is, because the expected aggregate audience size is the same in the cross-signaling SPBE as in a no tune-in regime. Thus, the sign of In summary, if the sampling cost is relatively low or the price of a commercial is relatively high, then a regime without any tune-ins generates the highest welfare. Otherwise, a regime that provides 'just enough'information to viewers will be welfare superior.
Thus, it may be welfare improving if the two stations were commonly owned by the same media company that maximized total ad revenues. In such a case, as long as v is relatively large, a no tune-in SPBE exists.
Tune-ins clearly bene…t viewers. Without tune-ins, viewers engage in too much ine¢ cient program sampling and some end up watching TV despite a negative utility. In the fully self-revealing SPBE, TV stations are forced to air too many tune-ins and this implies a large opportunity cost. Moreover, the higher the number of tune-ins, the more informed choices viewers make, implying a smaller audience size in the second period.
As a result, the stations are double jeopardized compared to a no tune-in regime. The former one of these two factors is also present in the cross-signaling SPBE; stations lose on the forgone revenue they could have earned from commercials. However, the expected aggregate audience size in the cross-signaling SPBE is the same as in a no tune-in regime.
This is the main reason why the cross-signaling SPBE may produce the highest expected welfare even if a no tune-in regime welfare-dominates the fully self-revealing SPBE.
When v is large, the hold-up problem becomes less severe and fewer viewers regret their initial choices. This makes the fully-revealing SPBE less penalizing. As a result, the fully-revealing SPBE will have a relatively larger set of parameters where it is socially the best. However, the main trade-o¤ remains the same: if p is relatively high, then advertising revenues become more important and a regime with no tune-ins will raise the highest ex-ante welfare. Similarly, if c is relatively high, then the most informative regime will be the best one. On the other hand, when v is small, tune-ins create new demand thereby expanding the set of viewers who watch TV. In this case, not only the viewers but also the TV stations bene…t from tune-ins. As a result, the fully-revealing SPBE will yield the highest ex-ante welfare even when p is relatively high. In other words, the fully-revealing SPBE is not only the unique market outcome when v is small, but also the socially optimal outcome. 
Appendix: Expected utility calculation
To …nd the expected viewer utility, one needs to calculate the expected utility of a random viewer in all of the nine possible program combinations, and then take the average of those. This is a tedious but otherwise straightforward task. For brevity, I …nd below the expected utility of a random viewer only for (y; z) = 0; , they infer that y = 0, so + v + c eventually stay, the others switch o¤. So,
) , + v + c 2c ,
Taking the di¤erences, we can express E U SR U N T as:
After simple algebra, this expression becomes
Similarly, E U CS U N T can be expressed as:
The case (y; z) = ; 1 is perfectly symmetric with (y; z) = 0; ; 0) (symmetric with (y; z) = 1;
): ) :
Finally, taking the average over all nine possible (y; z) cases, we reach equations (3) and (4), which are used in welfare calculations in section 3: , then all will switch away from Y (some will switch o¤ right away if v is small) and never come back -even if it turns that z = 1. It is thus pro…table to deviate and not air a tune-in for y = 1, thereby saving on the cost of the tune-in. The remaining possibility (that viewers assign a positive probability only to z = 1 after seeing a tune-in) cannot arise, because, given that it is optimal to air a tune-in when (y; z) = (1; 1), it must be then pro…table for Y to deviate and air a tune-in for y = 1 when z = 0 or z = , so as to mislead viewers to think that z = 1. Thus, it must be that q Y (1; z) = 0 for all z. Note that this proof does not make any use of passive beliefs, so it holds for all belief structures. Also note this result does not mean that viewers won't fully infer y = 1 in equilibrium. It may be the case that in equilibrium station Y airs a tune-in whenever y = 0 or 1 2 , so not seeing a tune-in would then mean that y = 1. . Switching back to Y is optimal for those for whom ), the net increase in audience will be c, which is greater than 1 2A
by the large A assumption.
Suppose that , which is true since
. Hence, for , station Y will strictly bene…t by not airing a tune-in for y = 0. Thus, the candidate SPBE is invalidated and as a result, Lemma 2 follows. The analysis is exactly the same for the 'vice versa'part and is therefore skipped.
Note that this proof again does not depend on the use of passive beliefs, so it is true for all belief structures. (the threshold viewer is found by 2 3 (v c ) + . and so station Y would deviate and air a tune-in for y = 0 when (y; z) = (0; 0).
To show that q Y , which is greater than , the interim beliefs will be (y; z) 2 0; c , which is greater than 1 2A
. Hence, deviation is pro…table. The arguments are identical for (y; z) = ; 0 . These observations establish Lemma 3. The construction has not used passive beliefs at all, so Lemma 3 is true for all belief structures.
driven by the (rationally) pessimistic inferences in the absence of a tune-in. If, for instance, station Y does not air a tune-in, its viewers will infer that y = 1. As a result, all will switch to Z and none will ever switch back to Y . In other words, punishment
for not airing a tune-in is very large. Therefore, station Y will be forced to air a tune-in when y = 0 or 1 2 . Note that these arguments do not depend on how one speci…es o¤-equilibrium beliefs, because o¤-equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant in the fully self-revealing SPBE (by Lemma 1, station Y would never consider airing a tune-in for y = 1). Lem- , yielding an audience size of will then switch to Z since it is more likely that z = 0). They will all stay at Z when they …nd out z = 0. Those who have stayed with Y will initially infer that z 2 f0; 1g upon seeing y = 0, so 1 4 in. Given the symmetry of the posterior beliefs, a random half of its viewers will stay with Y while the other half will switch away. Those who stayed will think that z = 1 upon seeing y = 0, and the ones with locations less than v + c will continue to stay. Those who have initially switched to Z will think that y = 1 upon seeing z = 0, and therefore none of them will switch back to Y . Hence, station Y will get an audience share of v+c 2
. From Table 5 , we see that station Y 's on-equilibrium audience size is 1 4 when (y; z) = (0; 0).
Note that all of these viewers are from station Y 's …rst-period audience. As a result, deviation is unpro…table if 
